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Abstract  
 
The study aims to examine the moderating effect of discretionary 
accounting choices on the relationship between top management 
demographic diversity and financial reporting quality among state 
commercial firms in Kenya based on 248 firm-year observations for 
2004 -2015. The study used correlational research design to achieve 
the sought objectives. It lays a broad foundation for the future research 
work into the theory and practice of financial reporting quality in 
commercial state corporations. The findings clearly reveal that, there exist 
both positive and negative relationship between discretionary accounting 
choices and financial reporting quality. However, the relationship varies 
with each financial reporting quality proxy measures. The demographic 
variables that were statistically significant in explaining FRQ were; age, 
education, tenure, gender and functional background diversity. Hence, 
managerial characteristics matter in explaining discretionary accounting 
choices and financial reporting quality in the companies. Despite the 
findings showed minimal significant effects on earnings quality and 
timeliness. Discretionary accounting choices should not be used by the 
management opportunistically but should be used to enhance quality 
reporting. The study  recommends that stakeholders in commercial 
state corporations should ensure that discretionary accounting choices 
is improved to decrease manipulations of accounting information in 
order to increase the quality of reporting. 
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1. Introduction 
The top management characteristics and optional accounting decisions have been major focal points for 
many researchers in exploring how they impact on quality reporting. However, a section of researchers believe 
that  top management diversity and discretionary accounting choices are often used by top management for 
opportunistic reseaons not for quality reporting (Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2008; Ge, Matsumoto, & Zhang, 2011; Omoro, Aduda, & Okiro, 2015). Basing the arguement on the  
upper echelon, agency theory, political cost theory and  discretionary-based disclosure theory (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Verrecchia, 2001; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) it is important to investigate how the top 
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management characteristics and optional accounting choices may influence quality reporting among state 
commercial firms. Although it is noted that accounting conventions and policies dictate the procedures for 
deriving quality reporting, there still exist managerial characteristics and discretionary opportunities to 
manipulate accounting records that affects reporting quality in the long-run. 
The managerial discretion may be explained along accounting policies on depreciation methods, inventory 
costing methods, revenue recognition, and cost of goods sold, reserves and allowances, contigent liabilities, 
advertising market expenditure and pension plans (Omoro et al., 2015). The studies that indicate much of the 
variations in financial reporting quality are not explained fully by variables such as firm level characteristics, 
corporate governance and executive compensation (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008). 
This makes it more interesting to explore more on other factors, given that accounting information quality is 
multi-dimensional. Managers‟ demographic diversity effect has been used in other studies to explain changes 
in discretionary accruals, earning smoothing, voluntary disclosures with no conclusive findings (Bamber et al., 
2010). Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) suggested that no conclusive 
research has been done on quality reporting by firms given the diversity and variations in measurements. 
Empirical studies by Collins, Pasewark, and Riley (2012) and Agoglia, Doupnik, and Tsakumis (2011) found 
differences between accounting choices by managers working under rather strict regulatory systems when 
compared to those working under rather flexible systems, although in the latter no rather scattered outcomes 
have been found, but it is hypothesized that this arrangements may affect quality reporting. 
The motivation to explore much on commercial state corporations is that most of the registered firms 
have been performing poorly and riddled with high corruption and corporate scam cases. It is therefore 
expected that their quality reporting should be like those of the listed companies. This is on the pretext that 
financial reporting practices are perceived to have improved significantly after ICPAK‟s decision to implement 
IFRSs. Since then, the quality of reporting among Kenyan companies has been a major concern from various 
stakeholders (Barako, 2007). According to the World Bank Report 2001 in Kenya on observance of standards 
and codes (ROSC, 2001) reveals gaps between applicable standards and accounting practices in many 
companies. The study by Center for Governance and Development (CGD 2005) in Kenya on audited accounts 
of state corporations reveals in-accuracy on most accounts of state corporations.  IFAC (2005) confirmed that 
requirements for adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) have been legalized in Kenya 
for enterprises of all types. This therefore confirms that the IFRSs are in use and applicable in commercial 
state corporations in Kenya to enhance quality reporting.  However, there has been laxity in quality reporting 
among many state commercial corporations due to lack of good will and commitment. Infact it was not until 
2014 when treasury, the auditor general and Ernest and Young teamed up to steer the IPSAS adoption in the 
central government that the implementation actually commenced. It is also a requirement by the Kenyan 
companies Act 2015, that directors prepare financial statement for each financial year which portrays true and 
fair view. 
Most of the empirical studies show that  discretionary accounting choices and top management 
characteristics  have  impact on quality reporting  (Bamber et al., 2010; Ge et al., 2011).  But this may not be a 
consensus given that most researcher have measured quality reporting differently (Biddle & Hilary, 2006) and 
Lambert et al. (2007).  This position is well documented by IASB (2008) that financial reporting quality does 
not only means earnings or stock price changes, but  a multi-dimensional term that requires  comprehensive 
measure. Top management across many firms are believed to use flexibility within the accounting standards to 
choose accounting methods, policies and estimates in financial reporting process which influence positively or 
negatively the firm„s  financial reporting quality. This assertion is based on the  discretionary-based disclosure 
theory which  provides the conceptual and theoretical framework used to examine the incentives that motivate  
corporate voluntary disclosure (Verrecchia, 2001). This theory evaluates under which circumstances 
companies choose to disclose or not disclose certain kinds of information in their financial statements.  
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
Agency theory claims that conflicts are expected to arise when there is incomplete and asymmetric 
information. Giner (1997) notes that managers will disclose more information or detailed information 
associated with agency problem. Determinants of disclosure are size, leverage, profitability and listing status. 
Agency problem is caused by top management characteristics. García-Meca, Parra, Larrán, and Martínez 
(2005) argues that disclosure serves to control agency cost. Lundholm and Winkle (2006) note that company‟s 
disclosure more when information is positive and less when there is friction such as information asymmetry 
and propriety costs. The most interesting part of the effect is on how the TMT personal characteristics would 
influence this disclosure in CSCs. Upper Echelon Theory explains that top management‟s characteristics 
(education, age, sex and tenure) influence the decisions that they make and thereafter  the actions adopted by 
the organizations that they lead. This is due to the fact that demographic characteristics are associated with 
many cognitive bases, values and perceptions that influence the decision making of top management 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Ling (2012) shows that individual managers play significant role in explaining how accounting accruals is 
influenced by accounting choices over time. Dechow and Schrand (2004) explored how top managers are able 
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to exercise discretion over reported earnings along various dimensions (aggressive, conservative and 
smoothing reporting). Each of these dimensions has intervening effect on financial reporting quality and 
demographic diversity of TMT since there seem to be indirect relationship. However, audit committee serve 
as a bridge in the communication network between internal and external auditors and the board of directors. 
Audit committee help to check the activities of the auditors (both internal and external) and top management 
resulting to the bridging of the gap among users of financial statements (Enofe, Ediae, & Ejiemen, 2013). 
Hribar and Yang (2010); Ling (2012); Helson (1998) explained candidly how  individual managers have 
great potential to enhance understanding of how managers consequently make financial reporting choices. 
Hribar and Yang (2010) have used demographic diversity of TMT as independent variable on discretionary 
accounting choices. Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson (2001); Cohen, Ganesh, and Wright (2004); Bamber et al. 
(2010) and Francois and Kyle (2011) have used demographic diversity of TMTs as independent variable on 
proxies of FRQ. In choosing activities, managers must often tradeoff between what to disclose and the 
expected value to be reported. Therefore corporate voluntary disclosure plays the role of tradeoff between the 
manager‟s incentives and the desired firm outcomes. Thus with corporate disclosure managers can influence 
the expected interpretation of financial reporting components. Since none of these studies has tested the causal 
linkages of the three variables, this leads to the preposition that: The relationship between demographic 
diversity of top executives and financial reporting quality is not mediated by discretionary accounting choices. 
Quite a number of studied carried out in Kenya failed to clearly explain on how top management 
characteristics and discretionary accounting choices influence reporting quality in state commercial 
enterprises (Kariuki & Jagongo, 2013; Mutiso & Kamau, 2013). However, a study by Outa (2011) pointed out 
that quality reporting in Kenya was generally low. The study used the proxies such as quality disclosure index 
and compliance index as a measure of quality reporting. However, the reviewed local studies reveal that most 
studies basically rely on IFRSs in explaining the level of FRQ in listed companies but are quite silent about 
commercial state corporations.  
From the international perspective, the Foundation Institute for Accounting Actuarial and Financial 
Research and Ernst & Young (2013) reports that any discretionary “change from rule-based accounting to 
principle-based accounting.” Would affect the quality of reporting of firms. Thus regulatory flexibility 
increases the complexity of procedures for recognizing, measuring, and disclosing accounting information, 
thus, greater subjectivity and higher degree of judgment were provided to the statements. 
 
2.1. Methods and Measures 
The study adopted correlational research design to indicate an association between the variables 
(Creswell, 2008; Lodico, Spaulding, & Voegtle, 2006). The study sampled firms‟ yield firm year observations of 
248 individual TMTs and annual financial statements from a group of none classified 30 state commercial 
corporations. The firm year observation was use as the sample size for the study.  The commercial state 
corporations were preferred for the study as they have well defined financial reporting framework and defined 
procedures for appointment of top management. Where secondary data was extracted from audited financial  
reports.  The study therefore sought to explain the model: 
FRQ = β0 +β1 Gen +β2 Edu +β3 Age +β4Ten+β5 FBG + β6 ACPL+  
Where: the model have three distinct variables: 
FRQ =Financial reporting quality. It is measured using four different proxies namely; fundamental 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information, quality disclosures in annual reports, timeliness of 
reports and earnings quality). 
 
2.2. Top Management Demographic Characteristics 
 Gen = Gender diversity of top management team. 
 Edu =Education Background diversity of top management team. 
 Age = Age diversity of top management team. 
 Ten = Tenure diversity of top management team. 
 FBG = Functional background diversity of top management team. 
 
2.3. Discretionary Accounting Choices 
ACPL = Discretionary Accounting policies and methods. 
 
3. Presentation and Analysis of Results  
Discretionary accounting measurement policies were measured using dummy variables (1 or 0) to 
determine the level of discretionary accounting choices made thus- if  aggressive choices in the discretionary 
accounting policies.  If accounting choice in year is coded „1‟ if the aggressive policies are chosen by 
management or zero (0) is conservative accounting policies is selected.  The study sought to determine the 
extent to which commercial state corporations use aggressive accounting policies in valuation and estimation 
of revenues earned, cost of sales, inventories, depreciation of fixed assets, allowances and contigent liabilities. 
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The descriptive statistics indicate that for accounting policies across all observations had overall mean of 
0.60415 which is above average. This shows that most of the firms preferred aggressive policies in the 
preparations of financial statements.  The use of aggressive of conservative accounting policies in revenue 
recognition, inventory valuation, estimates of provisions, bad debts and contigent liabilities was almost 
consistent. Through content analysis it was clear that almost all commercial state corporations clearly 
disclosed on any change of accounting policies and estimates. The policies used were adequately supported by 
relevant IFRSs and justification for the use provided. For example the depreciation method used across the 
commercial state corporations was basically straight line method and on revenue recognition there were 
variations across the corporations.  The results are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table-1. Analysis of variance on discretionary accounting policies. 
Source of variation d.f. s.s. m.s. Variance ratio. Fpr. 
Firm 29 4.00571 0.13813 4.3 P<0.001 
Residual 211 6.77014 0.03209 
 
 
Total 240 10.77585 
  
 
d.f. Mean standard error coefficient of variation  
211 0.60415 0.1791 29.6  
          
 
Researcher sought to examine how discretionary accounting choices are influenced by demographic 
diversity of top management team in Kenyan commercial state corporations. From the theory and empirical 
findings, demographic diversity of top management has provided mixed results with accounting choices. Most 
studies have looked at the effect of diversity across CFOs, CEOs, BoDs and audit committee. The accounting 
choices have also varied across each study. The findings are mixed with some demographic factors providing 
significant positive relationship on discretionary accounting choices and other studies providing negative 
relationship with varied discretionary accounting choices. The focus of this study was on the five discretionary 
accounting choices namely; revenue recognition policies, inventory and cost of sales methods, depreciation 
methods, provisions and bad debts and contigent liabilities. It would be expected, therefore that, demographic 
diversity would not have significant effect on discretionary accounting choices made by top management team 
in commercial state firms. In order to test the hypothesis multiple linear regressions was conducted. The 
results from regression analysis are presented in Table 2a.  
 
Table-2a. Regression results for demographic diversity and discretionary accounting choices. 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T 
    
Sig. B Std. Error Beta F R R2 AdjR2 
1 (Constant) .447 .063  7.082 7.172 0.366 0.134 0.115 .000 
Age .044 .046 .061 .963     .337 
Tenure .085 .041 .127 2.053     .041 
Gender -.040 .053 -.046 -.740     .460 
Education .282 .055 .335 5.114     .000 
FBG -.153 .063 -.157 -2.418     .016 
 
The linear regression results (beta = 0.61, 0.127, 0.335 and -0.157, t= 0.963,2.053, 5.114 and -2.4.418 
respectively with, p < 0.05).The findings presented in Table 2a shows that adjusted R2 is (0.115) meaning  
only 11.5% of the variation in discretionary accounting choices is explained by the combination of three 
demographic diversity variables, namely ; tenure, education and functional background. This is an indication 
that education diversity is positively (B=0.334) associated with discretionary accounting choices made by top 
management, hence, has the highest contributing coefficient factor then followed by tenure diversity (B= 
0.127). The implication is that a unit change in education diversity and tenure diversity would result to an 
increase in the use of discretionary accounting policies by 33.4% and 12.7% respectively. Functional 
background of the TMTs is inversely related to discretionary accounting choices made by top management 
(beta= -0.157). Meaning a change in the functional diversity results into a decrease in the use of aggressive 
accounting policies. The finding is consistent with past empirical findings and theoretical understandings. For 
example Bamber et al. (2010) finds positive relationship between functional backgrounds of CEOs with 
accounting choices made within the firm. 
We further conducted the Pearson‟s product moment correlation coefficient for demographic diversity 
(age and education) of top management was (r =0.127 p<0.05 and 0.307 p<0.01respectively) in Table 2b, it 
shows that at least two variables (age diversity and education diversity is positive and significantly related to 
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discretionary accounting choices made by TMTs. Thus the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant effect of demographic diversity of TMTs on discretionary accounting choices.  
 
Table-2b. Correlation between demographic diversity and discretionary accounting choices. 
Correlations 
  Age Tenure Gender Educa FBG ACPL VOLDC 
Age  1 0.024 -.136* 0.207** 0.09 .127* -0.125 
 Sig.  0.714 0.035 0.001 0.166 0.049 0.053 
Tenure  0.024 1 -0.079 0.042 0.121 0.122 0.104 
 Sig. 0.714  0.224 0.515 0.062 0.059 0.108 
Gender  -.136* -0.079 1 -0.013 0.009 -0.076 0.035 
 Sig. 0.035 0.224  0.843 0.893 0.24 0.586 
Educa  .207** 0.042 -0.013 1 .313** .307** -0.023 
 Sig. 0.001 0.515 0.843  0 0 0.724 
FBG  0.09 0.121 0.009 313** 1 -0.03 -0.012 
 Sig. 0.166 0.062 0.893 0  0.646 0.853 
ACPL  127* 0.122 -0.076 307** -0.03 1 0.113 
 Sig. 0.049 0.059 0.24 0 0.646  0.08 
VOLDC  -0.125 0.104 0.035 -0.023 -0.012 0.113 1 
 Sig. 0.053 0.108 0.586 0.724 0.853 0.08  
Note: *.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed).        
 
The Table 2b shows that discretionary accounting policies are positively (0.127, p< 0.05) associated with 
age diversity. This signifies that the more diverse the age of TMT, the more an aggressive accounting policies 
will be selected. It also shows that education diversity has positive relationship with discretionary accounting 
policies (0.307, p<0.01). This implies that the selection of aggressive accounting policies will increase with the 
diversity in education in the TMT of the commercial state corporations. 
In our second analysis the researcher sought to determine the relationship between discretionary 
accounting choices and quality financial reporting in commercial state corporations. From empirical studies, 
accounting choices are channels through which managers affect financial reporting quality. Most of the studies 
reviewed have so much concentrated in measuring quality reporting using different proxies such as earnings 
management, but this is not the only measure, there are other proxies that can be used - disclosure quality 
index, fundamental qualitative characteristics indices and timeliness in reporting. Therefore, it is anticipated in 
this study that the use of discretionary accounting choices would not have any significant relationship with 
other FRQ proxies. Hence, the hypothesis was tested and results reported in Table 3a. 3b and 3c. 
This Hypothesis was sub divided into four sub-hypotheses in order to test for the effect of discretionary 
accounting choices on the four proxies of financial reporting quality.  
H 02a: Discretionary accounting choices have no significant relationship with disclosure quality in commercial state 
corporations in Kenya. 
H 02b: Discretionary accounting choices have no significant relationship with fundamental qualitative characteristics in 
commercial state corporations in Kenya. 
H 02c: Discretionary accounting choices have no significant relationship with earnings management quality in 
commercial state corporations in Kenya. 
H 02d: Discretionary accounting choices have no significant relationship with timeliness quality in commercial state 
corporations in Kenya. 
Multiple linear regression analysis and correlations analysis were conducted on the four proxies of FRQ 
independently to test for the level of significance within the relationship.  
H 03a : Discretionary accounting choices have no significant relationship with disclosure quality in  commercial state 
corporations in Kenya. 
The result of Pearson correlations shows a correlation coefficient of r=0.016, p > 0.05. This is an 
indication of no relationship in the model. To confirm whether there is a relationship between  discretionary 
accounting choices and  disclosure quality, ordinary least square analysis was conducted and results presented 
in Table 3a. 
 
Table-3a. Regression results on the effect of discretionary accounting policies on disclosure quality. 
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. Error of the estimate F Sig. 
1 .016a 0 -0.004 0.225033636 0.059 0.808(a) 
       
Based on the results in Table 3a, R2 of (0.00) and adjusted R2 is (-0.004) which  confirms that the variation 
in disclosure quality is  not  explained by discretionary accounting choices. The implication is that 
discretionary accounting policies are one of the mandatory components of overall disclosure quality. Therefore 
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with R-square of 0.0, the F value of 0,059 is insignificant (Sig. =0.808) the discretionary accounting choices 
made in commercial state corporations, thus,  the model is not a good predictor of  disclosure quality in CSCs 
in Kenya, hence, H03a is confirmed. 
The second sub hypothesis,  Discretionary accounting choices have no significant relationship with  fundamental 
qualitative characteristics in commercial state corporations in Kenya,  was then tested.  Pearson moment  correlation 
was used as  to test for the relationship. The results from Table 3b (i) shows a correlation coefficient of r= 
0.045, p> 0.01. This means there is no significant  relationship between the two variables. In order to confirm 
the effect of discretionary accounting policies on fundamental qualitative characteristics, OLS was conducted 
and results of the findings are shown in Table 3b (ii) below : 
 
Table-3b(i). Correlations between discretionary accounting choices and FRQ. 
Correlations 
  Dquality Earnings QCharc Timeliness ACPL 
Dquality Pearson correlation 1 -0.005 0.194** 0.031 0.016 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.938 0.003 0.634 0.808 
Earnings Pearson correlation -0.005 1 -0.197** 0.076 0.051 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.938  0.003 0.253 0.441 
Qcharc Pearson correlation 0.194** -0.197** 1 -0.373** 0.045 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.003  0 0.485 
timeliness Pearson correlation 0.031 0.076 -0.373** 1 -0.113 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.634 0.253 0  0.08 
ACPL Pearson correlation 0.016 0.051 0.045 -0.113 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.808 0.441 0.485 0.08  
Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-taled). 
 
Table-3b(ii). Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accounting policies and fundamental qualitative 
characteristics. 
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. Error of the estimate F Sig 
1 .045a 0.002 -0.002 0.671942265 0.489 0.489(a) 
 
The results from Table 3b shows that R2  =0.002 and adjusted  R2 -0.002, this  implies that the model  is 
not a good predictor, at p value =0.485. Hence H03b is confirmed. 
The empirical studies and theoretical understandings is that discretionary accounting choices may be used 
to manage earnings, therefore many researchers suggest that financial reporting quality is affected by choice of 
accounting policies. Most of the empirical studies have been conducted in listed companies that are open to the 
market information as opposed to commercial state corporations that may lack incentives to mange earnings 
due to concentrated ownership by the state. Thus sub hypothesis three, discretionary accounting choices have no 
significant relationship with  earnings management quality was then tested.  The Pearson‟s moment  correlation 
results on the relationship between discretionary accounting policies and earnings quality showed r= 0.051, 
p= 0.441, the implication of the result was that discretionary accounting choices showed no significant 
relationship. And the results of OLS  also showed no significant effect on earnings quality. This is shown in 
Table 3c below.  The R-squared = 0.003 and adjusted R2 = -0.002 is insignificant in explaining any variation 
in earnings quality in commercial state corporations. Hence,  the null hypothesis 3c was confirmed. 
 
Table-3c. Regression results of the relationship between discretionary accounting choices and earnings quality. 
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. Error of the estimate F Sig. 
1 .051 0.003 -0.002 3.2227229 0.596 0.441 
   
The effect of timeliness in reporting of annual financial information has been discussed in the empirical 
literature as one of the qualities of good accounting information. Not much has been done to confirm the 
relationship between discretionary accounting choices and timeliness in reporting. Commercial state 
corporations take longer durations before the annual statements are published. This arguement inform the sub 
hypothesis thus: Discretionary accounting choices have no significant relationship with  timeliness reporting 
quality. 
The Pearson correlation results between discretionary accounting policies and timeliness reporting 
quality showed no significant relationship but have  negative correlations (r =-0.113, p= 0.08). The regression 
analysis also confirms that there is no significant effect between the two study variables. The results of the 
regression are shown in Table 3d: 
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Table-3d. Regression results of the relationship between discretionary accounting choices and timeliness reporting quality. 
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. Error of the estimate F Sig. 
1 .113a 0.013 0.009 5.06E+00 3.096 0.080 
 
Thus Hypothesis three is confirmed since the findings showed no significant effect between discretionary 
accounting choices (accounting policies) with timeliness reporting quality.  
The researcher further sought to establish the influence of discretionary accounting choices on the 
relationship between demographic diversity of TMTs and financial reporting quality. The hypothesis was 
then formulated within the stated objective.  The relationship between demographic diversity of top management 
team and financial reporting quality is not mediated by discretionary accounting choices.       
In order to test the hypothesis, the  researcher first sought to probe the intervening role played by 
discretionary accounting choices through the use of   Stepwise Multivariate Analysis. In order to establish the 
mediation effect, the Baron and Kenny (1986) was used.  
The two measures of FRQ namely, disclosure quality and earnings quality  do not meet first and second 
condition that is required for mediating effect as shown in hypothesis one, two and three. Therefore, only  two 
measures namely ; fundamental qualitative characteristics and timeliness reporting  are tested for the 
mediating effect on discretionary accounting choices  between the relationship of demographic diversity and 
financial reporting quality. Hypothesis four is therefore only  sub- divided into two sub hypotheses and results 
shown in Table 4a  and 4b: 
 
Table-4a (i). Regression results of the mediating effect of discretionary accounting choices and fundamental qualitative 
characteristics. 
Model 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.020 .273  7.398 .000 
Age .498 .180 .173 2.760 .006 
Tenure .394 .165 .146 2.386 .018 
Gender -.476 .213 -.138 -2.235 .026 
Education -.567 .222 -.162 -2.548 .011 
FBG .991 .258 .241 3.835 .000 
 
Table-4a (ii). Regression results of the mediating effect of discretionary accounting choices and fundamental qualitative characteristics. 
Model 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .767 .082  9.350 .000 
Age .031 .059 .034 .517 .605 
Tenure .029 .054 .035 .548 .584 
Gender -.109 .069 -.100 -1.576 .116 
Education .162 .072 .153 2.269 .024 
FBG -.340 .082 -.275 -4.140 .000 
 
Table-4a (iii). Regression results of the mediating effect of discretionary accounting choices and fundamental qualitative characteristics. 
  
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 
Standardized 
coefficients 
  Model 
 
B Std. Error Beta T Sig. 
1 (Constant) 2.063 0.276 
 
7.474 0 
 
Tenure 0.391 0.167 0.145 2.341 0.02 
 
Gender -0.573 0.213 -0.166 -2.694 0.008 
 
Education -0.45 0.222 -0.129 -2.032 0.043 
 
FBG 1.018 0.262 0.247 3.89 0 
2 (Constant) 1.929 0.297 
 
6.49 0 
 
Tenure 0.363 0.169 0.134 2.152 0.032 
 
Gender -0.558 0.213 -0.162 -2.624 0.009 
 
Education -0.548 0.235 -0.157 -2.327 0.021 
 
FBG 1.06 0.264 0.258 4.02 0 
 
ACPL 0.319 0.263 0.08 1.215 0.225 
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The results of the findings in Table 4a (i) to (iii) shows that there is no mediation effect with discretionary 
accounting choices. The first two steps are fulfilled in Table 4 (i)-(ii). The result shows no intervening effect in 
Table 4(iii). The B= 0.08 t= 1.215 at p=0.225. We therefore conclude there is no mediating effect; hence, the 
hypothesis H04a is confirmed. 
 
Table-4b (i). Regression results of the mediating effect of discretionary accounting choices and timeliness reporting quality (Step One). 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 13.537 1.985  6.820 .000 
Age 2.635 1.430 .120 1.842 .067 
Tenure -4.863 1.300 -.239 -3.741 .000 
Gender .604 1.678 .023 .360 .719 
Education -.617 1.733 -.024 -.356 .722 
FBG 2.421 1.986 .082 1.219 .224 
 
The findings reveal no mediating role from Table 4b (i) in the first step of the test. There is no significant 
results with coefficients of age, tenure, gender, education and functional background (FBG) B= 0.120. -0.239, 
0.023,-0.024 and 0.082, t=1.842, -3.741, 0.360, -0.356 and 1.219 with p = 0.067. 000, 0.719, 0.722 and 0.224. 
The hypothesis is therefore rejected since the four steps of Baron and Kenny is not fulfilled. 
 
Table-4b (ii). Influence of discretionary accounting choices on demographic  diversity of TMTand financial reporting quality (Step Two). 
Model Sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig. 
1 Regression .036 2 .018 .396 .673a 
Residual 10.702 237 .045   
Total 10.737 239    
 
The findings reveal that discretionary accounting choices on depreciation and inventory costing methods 
have insignificance influence on the relationship between demographic diversity of top management team and 
quality reporting. Therefore, the hypothesis is confirmed. 
 
4. Discussions  
It is evident from empirical literature that discretionary accounting policies have positive impact on 
earnings quality management. However, the current study failed to show any relationship between 
discretionary accounting choices based on (revenue recognition, depreciation on fixed assets, valuation of 
inventory and expenses on bad debts and contigent liabilities) and financial reporting quality measured under 
the four distinct measures. The only issue or alternative to these contradictions in findings is lack of autonomy 
in operations of the commercial state corporations. This may be supported by Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) who found out that, the use of discretionary accounting Policies in commercial enterprises in general is 
more pronounced where top management team potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value 
of stock and option holdings. This option is lacking in almost all the commercial state corporations. Most of 
the top management lack the motivation and will to make discretionary accounting choices that enhance the 
value of the firm. 
The composition of TMTs becomes critical in enhancing financial reporting quality in commercial 
entities. This has been a missing out policy and practice in commercial state corporations. The understandings 
from theoretical and empirical  research work is that individual specific characteristics have impact on financial 
reporting quality, although  most of the studies reviewed only present the effect of  demographic diversity on 
individual CEOs, CFOs, BoDs and audit committee on financial reporting quality measured by earnings 
management and audit quality. This gap has been bridged by having the current study looking at  the effect of 
demographic diversity on TMTs (which is a composition of CEOs, CFOs, internal Auditor and members of 
the audit committee as operationalized in chapter three) on disclosure quality, fundamental qualitative 
characteristics, earnings quality and timeliness in reporting. The study sets good presidence on enhancing 
governance towards high quality reporting in commercial state corporations in Kenya. One of the most 
challenges to modern managers, administrators and stakeholders of modern companies today is an 
establishment of an optimal mix within the TMTs, BoDs and audit committee in terms of gender, age, race, 
education, functional background and culture. Although much has been written and even legalized in the 
constitution  of Kenya (the current new constitution in Kenya  2010), little has been done to find out the best 
demographic diversity composition on TMTs for commercial state corporations which can create value for 
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money for  the entire stakeholders in the public sector. The stakeholder theory in the public sector tend to be 
weak or is not properly applied to enhance value creation by motivating stakeholders of CSCs demand high 
financial reporting  quality. None of the empirical studies are available in the CSCs in Kenya. 
Financial reporting quality is very important for the stakeholders in reducing information asymmetry 
between the management and the stakeholders. The reduction of the vital information increased financial 
reporting quality in the reporting companies. The importance of this is revealed in the current study findings 
that most TMTs provide corporate voluntary disclosure at will to their stakeholder. However, most of the 
empirical studies reviewed have much concentrated on the listed companies, hence, not much has been given 
on how long commercial state corporations in Kenya take to publish their statement. This makes the current 
study unique with other studies listed companies in the stock exchange. In Kenya  for example, listed 
commercial state corporations takes an average of ninety (90) day to release annual financial statements after 
each  year end. From the findings of the study, though not a comparative study, the findings is contrary to 
commercial state corporations not listed, which takes an average of 203.78 days or more to release the annual 
statement to the general public. What happens to this information that is held for these periods? This gap has 
been bridged by using timeliness reporting as a proxy of FRQ. The indicators have shown how long the 
financial reporting takes long. It shows how potentials of the commercial state corporations are destroyed and 
how inefficient the information is released to the potential investors. 
The findings seem to go against the theoretical and empirical understandings. The  theoretical 
understandings is that discretionary accounting choices are indirectly or direct associated with earnings 
management, disclosure quality and the nature of information expected from the annual reports. Smith and 
Watts (1992) find that inventory write downs, write off of receivables and depreciation methods used on fixed 
assets potentially lower earnings reported. Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) uses discretionary accounting 
choices to explain the quality of earnings forecast in listed companies. However, the context of the current 
study is different, but still the results raise questions why no relationship. The findings indicate that the five 
Policies used in the study only account for 29.6% variations. 
The theoretical understandings on the relationship between discretionary accounting choices is that the 
existence of pressure from shareholders, bondholders and regulators have greater influence on the choices 
made by TMTs. Healey 2005 argues that the choice of accounting Policies to use result from pressure of 
compensation, debt contract and political expectations. With freedom in accounting choices of policies and 
increase in information asymmetry there is need to enhance monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, 
it is not clear whether the freedom of choice may be influence by other factors other than top management. 
Ling (2012) finds that individual managers characteristics significantly influence accounting choices over 
time. His findings are consistent with the current findings where education, tenure and functional background 
of the TMT in commercial State Corporation significantly affect discretionary accounting policies. Helson 
(1998) finds significant relationship between discretionary accounting choices and earnings quality 
management and disclosure quality. Hribar and Yang (2010) find significant relationship between 
demographic characteristics of TMTs and accounting choices. Davidson, Xie, Xu, and Ning (2007) examined 
the relationship of top management age and functional career background on earnings quality. The findings 
showed that older managers are rarely associated with aggressive accounting policies that would increase 
earnings. All these studies point to a relationship between TMT characteristics and FRQ (earnings 
management), relationship between accounting Policies to FRQ (earnings management). Therefore the 
formulation of the hypothesis was informed by the literature. However, no literature linked of the literature to 
the other proxies for FRQ (disclosure quality, timeliness and fundamental characteristics).   
The literature has provided alternatives to why other measures namely; disclosure quality, timeliness and 
fundamental qualitative characteristics are not popular in literature. Beneish (2001) argues that most studies 
prefer using earnings quality as proxy FRQ  because it is easier to determine firms value from earnings. Jiang, 
Lee, and Anandarajan (2008) note that accounting earnings are the most widely used measures of FRQ, given 
that accounting rules and standards provide TMTs of firms with considerable opportunities for earnings 
management. Hence much attention has been devoted to earnings management. While Matsunaga and Yeung 
(2008) put it clear that FRQ depends on Managerial motives and characteristics, Hence the most appropriate 
measure is earnings management. 
Therefore the conclusion is that discretionary accounting choices do not mediate the relationship between 
demographic diversity and FRQ in commercial state corporations in Kenya. The failure of the mediation may 
be attributed to mode of measurement of the variables. The use of dummy variable result into sidelining one 
effect of the variable. The second reason would be the accounting Policies used were limited to five, and 
currently the level of discretion by the management might have been reduced through the adoption of 
international accounting standards in line with  FASB (2008).  
 
5. Recommendations  
This study lays a broad foundation for the future research work into the theory and practice of financial 
reporting quality in commercial state corporations in Kenya. The main objective of the study was to 
investigate the effect of demographic diversity of top management team, discretionary accounting choices on 
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financial reporting quality in commercial state corporations in Kenya. The study findings clearly reveal that, 
there exist both positive and negative relationship between discretionary accounting choices and financial 
reporting quality. The relationship varies with each financial reporting quality proxy measures. However, the 
demographic variables that were statistically significant in explaining FRQ were; age, education, tenure, 
gender and functional background diversity. Hence, managerial characteristics matter in explaining 
discretionary accounting choices and financial reporting quality in the listed companies in the stocks 
exchanges, we provide Novell findings on how demographic diversity of TMTs in commercial state 
corporations in Kenya influence financial reporting quality. 
The study finally recommends that future research could measure quality reporting using other indices of 
reporting quality and tracking specific fixed effect of top management team over time, since top executives 
background is an actionable variable for corporate board, better understandings of top management role is 
crucial for financial quality reporting. Discretionary accounting choices should not be used by the 
management opportunistically but should be used to enhance quality reporting. At the same time, the results 
can further help researcher explore the role of team members in explaining financial reporting quality and 
control the for top executives level characteristics when determining discretionary accounting choices. 
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